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Alarab Alyawm Hamas, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi terrorist designation Saudi Arabia's decision to criminalise the Muslim Brotherhood and place it on a terrorism watch list will undoubtedly have serious implications. The Saudi designation will be a new chapter marked by hostility for the group, which has over 20 branches spread across 17 countries where it is considered a legitimate political party by state authorities. The group's branches in Jordan and the Gaza Strip are bound to be affected. The government in Riyadh is not capable of taking any punitive action against Hamas, the Brotherhood offshoot in the Gaza Strip, because there is no communication or connection between the two sides to begin with. Not a single official in Hamas has ever received a Saudi official. In fact, the only time that Saudi officials have invited Hamas members to go to Saudi Arabia was when Riyadh tried to encourage reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah at the Makkah Conference in February 2007. That conference resulted in an agreement for national reconciliation through the formation of a new government headed by Ismail Haniyeh; it did not last long as clashes broke out between Fatah and Hamas. The Islamic Resistance Movement gained full control of the Gaza Strip in June of that year. Since that day, no official from Hamas has visited Saudi Arabia on official business; if anyone did go, it was to perform the lesser pilgrimage, Umrah. Hamas officials are prohibited from contacting any Saudi officials throughout the duration of their stay in the Kingdom when on pilgrimage. Saudi pressure on Hamas comes in the form of pressure exerted on the organisation by the Egyptian authorities, which placed the Palestinian group on a terrorist watch list some time ago. The Egyptians have banned all of the organisation's activities, shut down its offices, frozen all of its assets, destroyed its underground tunnels and enforced a political and economic siege based on charges that it supports the Muslim Brotherhood and is actively interfering in Egypt's internal affairs. In a phone call with a senior official in Hamas I was told of his deep concern over the worsening dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. He confirmed to me that the Hamas leadership held a secret meeting to discuss the matter and the potential implications for the movement. He pointed out that Saudi's efforts to force Qatar to cut ties with the Muslim Brotherhood would have disastrous repercussions on Hamas because Qatar functions as its backbone, lifeline and sole financial and political supporter. It is interesting to note that Hamas met Saudi Arabia's designation of the Brotherhood with absolute silence. In fact, no official comments have been made by Hamas's senior officials on either the Saudi decision to criminalise the Muslim Brotherhood or the Saudi-Qatari dispute. In contrast, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was courageous enough to declare its opposition to the Saudi move. Spokesman Zaki Bin Irsheid declared that he considered the Saudi decision to be hasty and emotional. "I am surprised that Saudi Arabia would make such a decision at this time, especially as it is being threatened by American and Zionist actions concerning the Iranian nuclear programme in the region," he said. "Is it possible that the Saudi authorities are cooperating with Bashar Al-Assad in his anti-Brotherhood sentiments and repression of the group?" Strong words indeed. In Egypt, meanwhile, a spokesman for the now illegal Brotherhood pointed out that the movement does not have any branches in Saudi Arabia. Two systems of government in the region were established and run on agreements between ruling families and religious movements. The first ruling family is that of Al-Saud and the second is the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. The former gained power based on a social and political contract with the fundamentalist Wahhabi movement while the latter established an understanding with the Muslim Brotherhood. The critical question that arises now is to what degree Saudi Arabia's actions toward the Brotherhood will shape the Jordanian government's actions towards the group. Will it follow in Riyadh's footsteps by prohibiting Brotherhood activities or will it prefer to distance itself from the decision altogether? The alliance and relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its Jordanian counterpart is very strong. It is no secret that this relationship is the reason behind the deteriorating relations between Jordan and Qatar and the reason why the government in Doha refuses to provide any economic aid to Amman. This also explains Qatar's refusal to hire anyone holding Jordanian citizenship within its economic institutions. Jordan's decision to keep up with Saudi Arabia and Egypt's decisions to criminalise the Muslim Brotherhood could have unpredictably horrendous repercussions, especially now as Jordan finds itself in a political minefield with an explosive geographic perimeter. The Syrian crisis grows more complex day by day in light of America's, Saudi Arabia's and Qatar's failed bets to topple the Assad regime. The situation in Iraq is also extremely volatile as the country stands on the edge of a volcano that could erupt at any second. As for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, they are on the verge of a third intifada due to the Palestinian Authority's failed attempts to negotiate peace with the Israelis. The Jordanian authorities must now make some very difficult decisions and any decision that they make, in any direction, will cost them a great deal. In this case, the safest option is no option. It is safer not to do anything at all.
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