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al Akhbar (Beirut)
Inevitable clash Riyadh's determination to pursue its war with Iran via its salafi proxies poses a threat to the region as a whole and to Lebanon in particular, says Sami Kleib "Among the latest developments in the international game is the fact that Afghani President Hamid Karzai is in Iran. This is a significant point in the context of the understandings being sought between Washington and Tehran. It is important to observe the shift in the issues included in these understandings if we are to predict the future of the region's conflicts and focal points of tension. This includes the situation in Lebanon that seems poised on the edge of an inevitable clash between the army and the extremist or takfiri groups that share al-Qa'ida's 'ambience.' How so? The borders between Iran and Afghanistan stretch for over 1000 kilometers. More than one million [Afghani] refugees - there were once two million - remain on Iranian territories. And there is an important tribal overlap between the two countries. Between Afghanistan and the U.S., there is the file of the long-awaited American military withdrawal that is supposed to be completed by the end of this year. Barack Obama's administration wants to secure a safe withdrawal from Afghani territories and a security agreement a number of whose clauses have been already rejected by Karzai. Tehran wants all foreign forces to leave the region, as President Hassan Rowhani stressed again on Sunday; and it is trying to ensure that the agreement will not affect Iran's regional security. The Americans would like Rowhani to contribute to the Afghan security agreement and to the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. The Iranian president may not mind this, but only in return for a number of conditions that must be satisfied. If a deal is struck, that would be one of the important points of understanding between the two sides. The opposite would mean that Iranian/U.S. understandings require a continuation of the tug-of-war between them. Judging from the statements made by the U.S. president a few days ago regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran, the situation seems to be heading towards a solution, rather than further escalation. If so, that would be an Iranian gift to the Americans in return for a price to be paid elsewhere. Two days before Karzai arrived in Tehran, the Iranian leadership was bidding farewell to Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki and his delegation. The high point of the visit was a meeting between the Iraqi guest and Sayyid Ali Khamene'i, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. Their discussions focused on expanding cooperation between the two countries as far as possible. This was followed by a series of contacts and visits on the part of an Iranian diplomatic delegations to a number of neighboring Gulf states. But the tempo of the bombings in Iraq also rose as soon as Maliki's visit ended. Amidst all this movement, the Iranian leadership did not issue a single word of criticism of Iran's Saudi neighbor. Iran's discourse continued to focus on attempting to open up lines of communication and expressions a desire to visit Riyadh. The move towards an Iranian/Turkish rapprochement continued, while President Rowhani's visit to Ankara is expected next month. Only Lebanon and Syria have remained as open arenas for the [Iranian] conflict with Saudi Arabia. The most serious development came from Hizbollah's Secretary-general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah who mentioned Saudi Arabia five times in his latest television interview with our colleague Jean 'Aziz. The charges he made were too important and serious to remain confined to the realm of random accusations. They gave the impression that Nasrallah was paving the way for some subsequent developments. Iran's most prominent ally in the region did not fail to mention that Saudi Arabia has been dealing with Iran as an enemy for thirty years. But what does this mean? Perhaps Nasrallah was being deliberately ambiguous. Some of the takfiris whom Sayyid Nasrallah accused Saudi Arabia of backing now have a presence in Lebanon. Lebanese Interior Minister Marwan Charbel confirms that ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] - which has threatened to liquidate him - has arrived in Lebanon. He said this a year-and-a-half after Lebanese Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn's repeated warnings against the threat posed by al-Qa'ida which were only met with criticism at the time. There are many stories, reports, and intelligence information regarding this threat. But what will the Lebanese army do? A few days ago, the head of Lebanon's Patriotic Struggle Front [Druze Leader] Walid Jumblatt took everyone by surprise. He demanded that the [pro-Hariri] Information Branch [of the Lebanese Security Forces] should be placed under the Lebanese Army's command. Did he say this because he wants to nip any potential sedition in the bud, or was this the result of some squabble with Saudi Arabia? The second surprise came from [former director of the Lebanese Security Forces and current pro-Hariri politician in the Northern city of Tripoli] General Ashraf Rifi (Retired) and the Consultative Gathering in Tripoli. They said that the state's security is guaranteed by 'legitimacy's rifles' and that can be no cover for any illegitimate weapons, whether used proactively or in reaction to something else [i.e. Hizbollah]. Lebanese Army Commander General Jean Qahwaji now faces a number of options, the sweetest of which is still quite bitter. He is expected to restore security and assert the state's authority. To achieve this, he must launch a battle against the takfiri groups. But such a battle will not be confined to these groups operating in Northern Lebanon alone. Reports are circulating about one Palestinian [refugee] camp in particular. There are claims that meetings are being held and actions are being coordinated with Qa'ida affiliated groups in Syria. There are claims of assassination lists and car bombs. There are stories about hidden strings in the attempted assassination of leading Fateh figure Mahmoud 'Issa, (aka al-Lino). There is similar talk about other areas, including Sheba'a, the Western Bika'a, and 'Irsal, and perhaps also [mostly Sunni] Tariq al-Jadidah in Beirut. No one can confirm the truth of these claims and rumors. The movements of the takfiri groups are often complicated and convoluted. But what is certain is that they never confine themselves to a single locale. Qahwaji enjoys Western cover. He also has Damascus' cover. He may not have responded positively to all of Syria's demands, but Damascus has not lost hope that his actions against the armed elements that enter Syria via Lebanon will be effective. At any rate, he is better than [Lebanese] President Michel Suleiman as far as Damascus is concerned. Will Qahwaji take action? How will he confront local and Saudi pressures demanding that he puts an end to Hizbollah's actions in Syria? Did President Suleiman not say that 'any weapons outside the state's structure and its united decision become part of the tools used in the struggle over power or hegemony'? This time round, the Lebanese army may find itself stuck between an international desire to implicate it in the regional war against terror, and certain parties' desires to carry part of the region's wars into Lebanon. In both cases, a clash has become inevitable.
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