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as-Safir - Beirut Toward another Karbala? Syrian and Lebanese arenas became war areas. There has been a decision by some States to take the conflict with Tehran to unprecedented levels, writes Elie al-Ferzli At the very moment when the Syrian army was taking control of the strategic village of Qarra in the Western Syrian, Qalamoun district, two suicide bombers blew themselves up before the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. Everyone who has examined this development has recognized it is an official declaration that the Syrian and Lebanese arenas have now become one, and that there has been a decision to take the conflict with Tehran to unprecedented levels. The pro-Damascus March 8th camp, has issued a political verdict condemning a certain 'regional party' of responsibility for the bombings in the Jinnah area where the Iranian Embassy is located. Even the Iranian ambassador's public accusation of Israel was interpreted as a reference to the involvement of a 'certain Arab party,' in accordance with Iran's custom of deeming any attempt to target the Iranian/Syrian/Hizbollah axis of resistance as a service to Israel. After everyone has bent over backwards to reserve a place for themselves at the 'nuclear Iran Geneva' and the 'peace in Syria Geneva,' two states have continued to refuse to acknowledge the facts: The first, Israel, is doing everything possible to obstruct the nuclear agreement; and the second, Saudi Arabia, is fighting a peaceful solution in Syria with all the weapons it can muster. And although Israel has a permanent interest in setting Lebanon alight, the two parties to the domestic conflict in Lebanon have linked the attack on the embassy to the Syrian conflict, each from their own perspective. In both cases, no one expects that what has happened will change what has already been decided in the Syrian battlefield: The Syrian army will continue to pursue its policy of forcefully and gradually regaining the areas controlled by the opposition; and Hizbollah and Iran will continue what they have begun in Syria. Given this, what benefit could have been sought by those who planned and carried out the suicide attack in Jinnah? For the Lebanese anti-Syrian March 14th camp, and for the pro-Saudi Hariri-led Future Current in particular, there is now great concern that Lebanon is heading the way of Iraq. According to March 14th, Hizbollah is solely responsible for this state of affairs which has 'dragged Lebanon towards hell and awakened the extremists after slamming the doors shut in the moderates' faces.' And if, March 8th's politicians and experts have detected certain Saudi fingerprints in the bombing, the Future Current has gone to some length to remind us of its Gulf allies heroic stance in confronting al-Qa'ida. In both camps, officials are dealing with what is happening in Lebanon as if they were experts discussing a foreign country, given that they have all surrendered their fate to their respective regional sponsors. And until the course of the conflict in the region becomes clear, it seems that the Lebanese will be forced to deal with the term 'suicide bombers' which has now entered their lives via the gates of the Iranian Embassy. One researcher, who is viewed to be close to the 'pro-resistance Hizbollah line' insists that Jinnah bombing should be viewed as of a different nature to the previous bombings in the Southern Dahyieh, Hizbollah stronghold in Beirut's Southern suburbs, and largely Sunni Northern city of Tripoli, even if all these bombings fall within the same framework of the current battle in Syria. Tuesday represented a new turning point in the history of the struggle for Damascus: When 'suicide bombings' become an element on the Lebanese arena, the above mentioned source argues that this is worthy of significant further consideration. He notes that it has escalated the level of the confrontation and broken all taboos. He believes that the fact that the Iranian Embassy was targeted represents an attempt to escalate the regional conflict. Moreover, targeting the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in particular is meant to send a strong message to those concerned. All this leads to a single conclusion: The party most harmed by the peaceful settlement, Saudi Arabia, has decided to throw all of its cards on the table. It is no longer confining itself to making use of its tools to announce its presence; it has now directly entered the arena demanding that the other side should either make concessions or come to some understanding. This is how March 8th's politicians view the matter. Since Saudi concessions are impossible in light of the facts on the ground where the Syrian regime is deciding the battle in its favor, which undermines any justification for convening Geneva-2, according to the same source, Saudi Arabia is still insisting on living the dream of taking hold of the Arab arena and ejecting Iran's influence from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. And because these states have now all de facto become a single arena, the Saudis still believe that Lebanon is a fertile ground for compensating for their losses in Iraq and Syria. For this reason, they still wagered on the possibility of including Lebanon as part of their regional share, until Hizbollah leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, announced his refusal to allow Lebanon to be offered as a compensation prize to anyone, while asserting that trying to bypass Hizbollah in the domestic equation would be a big mistake, at the same time. The Saudis realize that submission to what Washington wants, in the manner of the Turks and the Qataris, is not possible for those who seek to consolidate their position in the region, especially since the Americans have abandoned them publicly, preferring to disentangle themselves from the quagmire of regional wars. The Saudis have come to realize that they have to assume responsibility for defending their existence, given their conviction that Iranian influence is destroying any hope of ensuring the future of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, or even the future unity of the Arabian Peninsula. The same pro-Hizbollah source says that 'they have no tools in their hands other than the salafi networks they have sponsored for many long years in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, and that have been transformed into a valuable infrastructure they can move from one arena to the other.' For the Saudis, the Syrian regime is no longer the primary enemy; that accolade belongs to Iran. This same researcher in Iranian affairs can see no alternative available to Saudi Arabia other than that of joining a peaceful solution, like the rest of the parties to the war on Syria. But there are no real prizes to obtain in return, other than confirmation of its status as a major state that is a partner to the settlement and that can help to uphold the region's stability and play a role in ensuring the stability of the oil market in cooperation with its neighbors. As for talk of leading the Arab states, this is beyond Saudi Arabia's capabilities. What of the Iranian role? This same source confirms that any party that holds the same cards as Iran would not accept to be dragged to a localized reaction. The Iranian ambassador's accusation of Israel merely confirms Tehran's refusal to enter a public confrontation with any regional party. It prefers to maintain its balance and complete its Syria strategy instead. That is a strategy that is proving its success with each passing day, further consolidating Tehran's confidence that victory will ultimately go its way.
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